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Abstract: 
There is growing evidence that microcredit does little to support self-
employment. Two main explanations are typically emphasized. From a 
microeconomic perspective, the poor have been argued to lack the skills, 
resources and motivation to start their own businesses. From a 
macroeconomic perspective, local markets are often saturated. In this 
paper, we use first-hand data from rural South India to explore a third 
explanation focussing on the social regulation of markets. Drawing on a 
household survey, we show that self-employment and microcredit are 
uncorrelated, and that women and lower castes have a significantly lower 
chance of starting up a business. The businesses they do start tend to be 
smaller, less profitable and based in very specific sectors. Our qualitative 
insights into the workings of local economies show that caste and gender-
based social regulations influence local markets determining who can 
produce or sell what, to whom, and at what price. We observe that real 
markets are affected by power relations and structured through social 
institutions rather than being the sum of interactions between free and 
competitive individuals. These findings show the importance to integrate 
self-employment programmes into broader policies for transforming the 
social regulation of markets and for eradicating discrimination against 
women and lower castes.  caste and gender-based social regulations have 
an impact on local markets, determining who can produce or sell what, to 
whom, and to some extent at what price. Our findings highlight the need to 
integrate ‘self-employment’ programmes into broader policies for 
transforming how markets are socially regulated.   
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The social regulation of markets 
Why microcredit fails to promote jobs in rural South India1 
 
 
Abstract 
There is growing evidence that microcredit does little to support self-employment. Two main explanations 
are typically emphasized. From a microeconomic perspective, the poor have been argued to lack the skills, 
resources and motivation to start their own businesses. From a macroeconomic perspective, local markets 
are often saturated. In this paper, we use first-hand data from rural South India to explore a third 
explanation focussing on the social regulation of markets. Drawing on a household survey, we show that 
self-employment and microcredit are uncorrelated, and that women and lower castes have a significantly 
lower chance of starting up a business. The businesses they do start tend to be smaller, less profitable and 
based in very specific sectors. Our qualitative insights into the workings of local economies show that 
caste and gender-based social regulations influence local markets determining who can produce or sell 
what, to whom, and at what price. We observe that real markets are affected by power relations and 
structured through social institutions rather than being the sum of interactions between free and 
competitive individuals. These findings show the importance to integrate self-employment programmes 
into broader policies for transforming the social regulation of markets and for eradicating discrimination 
against women and lower castes.   
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Introduction 
Can promoting self-employment offer an effective way out of poverty? The debate on  self-employment, 
poverty and development has swung back and forth over the second half of the twentieth century. In the 
early 1970s, researchers and policymakers came to agree on the potential of small businesses to help 
develop local economies (ILO, 1972). But they also observed that these emerging local economies were 
typically ‘informal’ (Hart, 1973), beyond any form of regulation, and that businesses struggled to become 
profitable. It was often thought that such informal self-employment would disappear as local economies 
modernized and formalized.  
                                      
1
 Field work was carried out between 2008 and 2012 within the research project Rural Microfinance and 
Employment: Do Processes Matter? funded by the French National Agency for Research (ANR). 
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Since the 1990s, social scientists and development planners experienced the complexity of moving beyond 
an informal economy and realized that developing the informal sector can in fact facilitate agrarian 
transitions and industrialization. At a time of structural economic adjustments where jobs could no longer 
be provided by the state, self-employment began to be promoted as both an individual safety net and an 
accelerator to local development (Turnham et al., 1990). The first decade of the twenty-first century 
marked the peak of this praise for self-employment and the success of microcredit that came with it. 2005 
was declared the International Year of Microcredit, with the goal of “building inclusive financial sectors 
and strengthening the powerful, but often untapped, entrepreneurial spirit existing in communities around 
the world”2. When Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 
2006, the Nobel Committee affirmed that “across cultures and civilisations, Yunus and Grameen Bank 
have shown that the poor can work to bring about their own development […] Micro-credit promotes 
entrepreneurship3, and puts each individual poor person, especially women, in the driving-seat of their 
own lives"4.  
Today, however, self-employment policies have been increasingly questioned. Several years ago, various 
in-depth studies pointed out the difficulties of making entrepreneurs out of the poor via microcredit 
(Servet, 2006). This was shown for instance for Senegal (Perry, 2002), Egypt (Elyachar, 2006) and 
Bangladesh (Rahman, 1999). These findings, however, were regarded as exceptions since the chosen 
research method of focusing on just a few villages or neighbourhoods made generalisations problematic. 
More recent studies have shown that most microcredit is in fact used for consumption rather than income-
generating activities (Morduch, 2013) and as a consequence it has had a limited impact on job creation.  
Two main points have been raised to explain this. First, a microeconomic perspective has been taken to 
argue that the poor lack the skills, resources or motivation to start their own business. This has been one of 
the main conclusions of recent experimental studies (see for instance Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). In his 
book Why doesn't microfinance work? Bateman (2010) looks at the other side of the coin, namely markets 
and macroeconomic development to back up arguments already made by authors as Servet (2006, 2010), 
Davis (2006), and Karnani (2011). Microcredit promoters' biggest mistake, Bateman argues, is their 
ignorance of composition effects and their naive adherence to a particular interpretation of the law of Say, 
by which supply creates its own demand. Local markets are very often already saturated. New and 
expanded microcredit-induced microbusinesses do not develop local demand but merely redistribute it 
                                      
2
 http://www.yearofmicrocredit.org.  
3
 Yunus does not really discuss the term ‘entrepreneurship’. Here we use simpler terms such as ‘small businesses’ or 
‘self-employment’. Discussing the various forms of entrepreneurship is beyond the scope of this paper.  
4
 http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/presentation-speech.html 
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which results in a variety of displacement effects i.e. new businesses replacing old ones, and the tendency 
for profitability to fall  (Bateman, 2010, pg. 66-73).  
We believe, however, that the literature has ignored the social and hierarchical features of markets as a 
further explanatory factor. Political economics has long highlighted the subordinate relationships of small 
businesses to larger entities within the capitalist sector, especially in the literature on agrarian change and 
petty commodity production (Moser, 1978; Williams, 1982). Economic subordination has been found to 
go hand in hand with social discrimination, defined here as specific social groups facing restrictions or 
differential treatment (Harriss-White, 2012).  
This paper will explore the social structures of self-employment by examining how gender and caste-
induced social norms affect the likelihood and success of self-employment. Caste and gender determine 
access to crucial resources for entering the market. Moreover, these social variables feed into the social 
institutions of power that shape, regulate and define the operating rules of markets. 
There have already been a number of empirical studies on the Indian microcredit market. Some have 
clearly shown that gender, caste and class relationships influence microcredit outcomes. Women from low 
castes and classes are either excluded from self-help group schemes, or unable to use them effectively 
(Garikipati, 2008; Pattenden, 2011; Rao, 2008). To complement these studies, our focus is on the 
challenges of business creation and the workings of markets more generally which received little prior 
attention. Our paper applies hand-collected data from a survey of 1,929 people from 405 households in 
rural South India, alongside 10 years of observation of village economies.  
We find that, while microcredit is widespread across the region, the chance of being self-employed is 
statistically uncorrelated to microcredit. Women and lower castes (Dalits) have a significantly lower 
chance of starting up a business, controlling for individual, household and geographical differences. 
Finally, there are significant differences in the type of businesses created. Women tend to create smaller 
business and are less likely to hire extra employees. Businesses set up and run by the lowest castes are 
typically smaller and younger. Those started up by women and the lowest castes are significantly less 
profitable in terms of annual income. Our qualitative insights can further explain the underlying processes 
and mechanisms at play. They also highlight the key role of social institutions in shaping the structure of 
markets and their hierarchical dimensions.  
We believe this paper makes a number of important policy contributions. First, it shows that microcredit is 
unsuccessful in stimulating job creation. The most vulnerable households are in fact least likely to start up 
a sustainable income-generating activity. This also implies that microcredit can only be an effective job 
creation mechanism if certain preconditions are met. These include the alleviation of the social, cultural 
and political barriers women and lower castes face. As it stands, microcredit tends to reinforce rather than 
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alleviate social inequalities, given the types of businesses women and lower castes create. Furthermore, 
our findings shed light on the social construction of markets, and the need to integrate self-employment 
policies into a broader project for changing how markets are socially structured and regulated.  
 
A literature review on ‘self-employment’ and ‘market-conceptualization’ 
The World Bank Development Report 2013 (World Bank, 2013) states that nonfarm self-employment 
varies widely from 20% to 60% of men and women’s combined employment in developing countries. 
This figure is highest in Africa (around 45% on average) and lowest in Europe and Central Asia and South 
Asia (with an average of around 15% and 20% respectively). For India, the 2009-2010 National Sample 
Survey suggests that total self-employment can rise to 50% of the total working population (NSS 66th 
round) and non-farm self-employment to around 20% (Srivastava, 2012).   
There is no agreement whether self-employment still has the potential to grow. This depends on how the 
market is conceptualized. One viewpoint is that markets are intrinsically productive. They allow 
individual creativity and competition to flourish, which are both considered as “driving forces for all 
innovations, technological changes and better management” (Yunus, 2007). This ideological take on 
markets is central to the concept of ‘popular capitalism’ propounded by bestselling economists such as De 
Soto (The Mystery of Capital, 2003) and Prahalad (The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid, 2004) and 
further expanded upon by Yunus (A World Without Poverty, 2007). Various barriers have been argued to 
keep the poor from accessing markets. These include a lack of credit or property rights, or simply not 
being seen as a profitable market opportunity for larger companies. Poor people are however assumed to 
have unlimited yet often hidden ‘entrepreneurial spirit’. Once the above barriers are removed, it is argued, 
their creative talents can be fully tapped and equal market participation becomes possible. Some empirical 
studies support this view. A broad empirical study in Latin America funded by the World Bank found that 
while self-employment can be precarious and unprofitable for a few individuals, it benefits the majority 
(Maloney, 2004). The World Bank has also widely supported this view in its own reports (see for instance 
World Bank, 2004).  
Recent studies have adopted a more nuanced perspective, exploring the vast diversity of self-employment. 
They have highlighted the differences between ‘opportunity’ and ‘necessity’, ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors, and 
‘growth-oriented’ and ‘survivalist-oriented’ self-employment (De Mel et al., 2010; Verrest, 2012; 
Ligthelms, 2005 ; Grimm et al., 2012 ; Berner et al., 2012). These studies' bottom line is that genuine 
growth-oriented entrepreneurs do exist but the vast majority of the self-employed are simply struggling to 
survive in a difficult, often saturated and low-growth setting (Cling et al., 2015).  
Page 5 of 27 Development and Change
5 
 
The above studies neglect the structural preconditions for self-employment to flourish. In a highly 
abstracted approach, markets are viewed as an aggregation of individuals. Taking successful advantage of 
the market opportunities is a matter of individual characteristics. Randomized studies, which have become 
widely accepted as the most rigorous impact assessment method for development policies, including 
microcredit, have pushed such a microeconomic approach to an extreme. Banerjee and Duflo (2011) have 
notably used insights from behavioural economics to explain the failures of specific markets (such as 
credit, insurance or savings markets) in broadly psychological or cognitive terms. They have 
acknowledged that many small businesses have remained tiny and poorly profitable with little growth 
prospects. But they offer no convincing explanation for this, simply commenting: “It is too hard” (ibid., 
pg. 223). Individuals who can successfully run larger firms may have some kind of “special skill or a 
much larger up-front investment” (ibid., pg. 221). Social institutions such as gender or caste are ignored as 
potential obstacles to self-employment. 
Livelihood studies try to take into account the full range of human, social, natural, physical and financial 
assets, to understand the poor's economic strategies in the face of crises and opportunities. One key 
conclusion has been that not all assets required for running a business are readily available to the poor 
(Verrest, 2012). Here too, however, little attention has been paid to the structural causes of such exclusion 
processes (Da Corta, 2011, pg. 26-27). Arguably, the concept of ‘social capital’ suffers from a similar 
weakness. It is seen as a way to take social context into account and to explain market failures. But social 
capital is too often taken as an individual rather than a collective resource (Harriss, 2006). These 
approaches theorise only on the level of the individual but fail to undertake a deeper structural causal 
analysis of how markets really work.  
Macro-economic approaches, like those of Davis (2006), Karnani (2011) and Bateman (2010) offer a 
more convincing understanding of the limits of self-employment. They situate local markets within a 
broader analysis of present-day accumulation models. However, they pay little attention to the social 
regulation of markets and the unequal capacity of specific groups to influence how markets operate. While 
the issue of power is too often ignored in development studies, a long tradition within political economics 
has tried to understand the causal mechanisms behind the hierarchical features of local markets. Such 
literature inspired by a Marxist approach has looked at how production forces and the social relations 
behind production, mostly defined in terms of the ownership and control of the means of production, 
determine processes of accumulation, exploitation and the complex linkages between production and 
distribution systems5. It does not approach small producers and entrepreneurs, or ‘petty commodity 
                                      
5
 See for instance Moser (1978), Williams (1982). For India, see Bhaduri (1986); Bharadwaj (1985); Harriss (1982), 
Hale (1978).  
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producers’ as they are often referred to, as isolated entities. It instead considers their position within the 
wider economy. Within the economic hierarchy, such producers are clearly confined to poorly profitable 
activities and doomed to ‘self-exploitation’. This is due to their highly asymmetric bargaining power on 
various markets, as a result of discriminative, exploitative and monopolistic sub-contracting positions, and 
a lack of influence over regulatory institutions. Petty commodity producers also face discriminatory social 
regulation. While they can mostly evade legal supervision and taxes, various social institutions such as 
gender, caste, ethnicity, religion, age and place, have a determining impact. This in turn affects a vast 
array of factors, including occupations, recruitment, apprenticeships, pricing, the design and enforcement 
of contracts, conflict resolution, license or public contract deliveries, credit access, land, space and energy. 
(Harriss-White 2010, 2012). 
It could be argued that modernization and globalization are bringing about the decline of traditional 
aspects of hierarchy and social discrimination. Recent work has however shown this not to be the case. 
So-called ‘traditional’ institutions may be evolving, but they still influence accumulation processes, 
structures and opportunities (Harriss-White, 2003). This is clear in terms of gender with a great amount of 
evidence from India and elsewhere that gender and patriarchal norms still determine occupations, value 
chain positions, access to various sorts of resources and both individual and collective bargaining6. But it 
is also clear for other marginalized groups as can be seen in the large body of evidence garnered by 
Barbara Harriss-White on Indian labour markets (2003), or in more specific work on Dalit 
entrepreneurship (Prakash, 2010). As will be shown in this paper, looking at how real markets operate 
offers a better understanding of microcredit failure in terms of job creation. 
 
Methodology  
This paper uses multivariate analyses of household surveys together with qualitative analysis of how 
markets operate. Its qualitative and quantitative insights should be seen as complementary ways to 
establish causalities and understand underlying processes (Rao and Woolcock, 2003). Our initial 
qualitative analysis allowed us to generate the hypotheses that caste and gender influence both the chance 
of being self-employed and the type of self-employment. Statistical data and econometric analyses were 
then applied to establish correlations and isolate the role of specific variables on self-employment. We 
then turned to further qualitative analysis to better understand the processes underlying these correlations. 
The results are part of a long-term research program on labour and finance set in various districts in north 
and coastal rural Tamil Nadu. The program has been running since 2003. It brings together researchers 
                                      
6
 In India, see for instance Unni (2008) for a general overview, Mezzadri (2012) for the garment industry, Bhowmik 
and Saha (2012) for street vendors, Sudarshan et al. (2007) for home-based workers. 
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from different backgrounds, some of whom live on site. It draws on a wide range of methods, including 
semi-directive interviews, case studies, close analyses of villages, value chains and markets and household 
surveys. We have spent considerable time in the villages and in the markets, observing transactions, 
discussing informally with vendors, buyers, wholesalers and financers. Fieldwork was done in various 
sectors including transportation, weaving, and tailoring, which are the most common crafts for local 
entrepreneurs. We undertook detailed case studies of around forty entrepreneurs who run different sizes of 
businesses in different sectors. 
The main objective of our ongoing interviews and informal discussions was to understand the paths these 
entrepreneurs had followed. How did they operate their businesses and what was their position within 
their particular value chain? We also spent time at strategic sites such as the tea stalls popular with local 
entrepreneurs, where many transactions and discussions happen. Most of the data we present here comes 
from our observation of how real markets operate.  
Our quantitative data comes from a household survey done in March 2010 on 405 households. The main 
objective was to quantify the diversity of labour and financial relationships of all household members, and 
the type of underlying nature of their social relationships. We took a sample of households from ten 
villages on the border of two districts (Villupuram and Cuddalore districts). Households and villages were 
randomly selected, using a stratified sample based on caste and location in terms of water availability and 
distance to town.  
 
Context 
The studied zone is economically dynamic featuring a large proportion of irrigated agriculture, two 
industrial towns (Neyveli and Cuddalore) and a regional business centre (Panruti)7. A lack of economic 
dynamism cannot therefore account for the challenges its small businesspeople face. As elsewhere in 
Tamil Nadu and India, caste remains a fundamental factor in social, economic, ritualistic and political life. 
Caste here is inherited through one’s birth group. It is characterized by endogamy, the rules of 
commensality and hierarchy, the latter still being associated with ritual dirt and pollution. Vanniyars and 
Paraiyars are the two major local groups across the region. Vanniyars are a farming caste with a low ritual 
rank, but in the villages we studied, as in many places in northeast Tamil Nadu, they control much of the 
land and are politically dominant8. Paraiyars are one of the three major Dalit (ex-untouchable) 
communities in Tamil Nadu. They are particularly well-established in the north of the state. There are also 
few Arunthathiyars among the Dalits. The upper castes of the local hierarchy are the Mudaliyars, Naidus, 
                                      
7
 For more details on the region under study, see Guérin et al. (2014) 
8
 There are also a few Gramanis, Navithars, Nattars, Kulalars and Asarais, who have a similar position in the caste 
hierarchy. 
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Reddiyars and Settus, who account for only a small proportion of the village population. They have 
mostly moved away from the villages to nearby towns, adopting urban jobs and lifestyles. Christians and 
Muslims are a minority in the area. 
The region is financially dynamic, with microcredit just one option among many. Both men and women 
juggle a wide range of borrowing sources. These include private moneylenders, pawnbrokers, traders, 
suppliers, employers, shopkeepers, family and friends. Banks play only a minor role (Guérin et al., 
2013b). There are three microcredit providers in the area. One is an NGO, while the two others are non-
banking financial institutions. Microloans are delivered exclusively through self-help-groups (SHG) which 
is the most common form of microcredit in India (Garikipati, 2008; Kalpana, 2011). SHGs have fifteen to 
twenty members, mostly women who circulate money within the group, and who are eligible for external 
loans. Women can also apply for much larger individual loans than typical SHG loans. While the provider 
chooses the beneficiaries, the group still plays an intermediary role and remains responsible for the 
repayments. The area's three microcredit organizations all have the clear goal of promoting income-
generating activities.  
 
The chance of being self-employed 
This section assesses whether access to microcredit statistically influences the chance of being self-
employed. We also analyse whether caste and gender statistically influence that chance. Table 1 shows 
rates of self-employment on a household (panel A) and individual level (panel B) for the total sample, as 
well as for men versus women, and Dalits versus higher castes. T-tests and Pearson χ²-statistics assert 
whether the observed gender and caste-differences are statistically significant.  
The unit of analysis for Panel A is the household, which is considered self-employed when the household 
has at least one self-employed member. 37% of all households prove to have at least one self-employed 
member. This rate is significantly higher for mid and upper castes (45%) than Dalits (28%). In Panel B, an 
individual is considered self-employed if he or she is the main initiator of a business. It shows that 9% of 
all people are self-employed, but this rate is significantly lower for women (3%) than men (14%). It is also 
significantly lower for Dalits (6%) than for mid and upper castes (12%). 
 
<Insert table 1> 
 
Table 2 presents LOGIT analyses where the chance of being self-employed is regressed against gender 
and caste, controlling for individual characteristics (age and education) and household characteristics (size 
of household, social networks and land ownership). The different columns test for the inclusion of 
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additional geographical controls to account for location-specific differences in self-employment. The 
results broadly confirm the descriptive statistics. Women and Dalits have a significantly lower chance of 
being self-employed after controlling for individual, household and geographical factors. The F-statistics 
and R²-statistics are generally satisfactory and improve when additional geographical controls are taken 
up.  
 
<Insert table 2> 
 
Our qualitative work gives an additional insight into these self-employment statistics. Our fieldwork 
showed that gender and caste largely determine the nature of networks which may or may not be able to 
deliver the skills and resources for running a business successfully. For instance, they are determining 
factors for getting accurate market information, obtaining orders and supplies, meeting credit needs, and 
arranging labour supplies. This goes for both new and longer-standing businesses. Caste and gender also 
influence existing social norms and are important drivers within the local markets. Restrictions on 
women's physical mobility and contact with strangers are a major obstacle to running a business, for 
instance. The most important caste barriers reflect two key hierarchical features. These are the segregated 
division of labour, and ‘untouchability’. They have both changed over time and their continued role in the 
caste system has been subject to much debate but both clearly still considerably influence village life, 
social relationships and occupations in this region. We will address this more in depth in the next section 
when discussing the types of businesses in which Dalits are active.  
In Table 3, we analyse whether access to microcredit is an important factor in starting up a business. In the 
first three columns we add a dummy that is 1 if the family has access to microcredit 
(dumMICROCREDIT) as an extra explanatory variable to the previous LOGIT analyses. As can be seen, 
the coefficient on the dummy is not significant in any of the specifications, suggesting that the chance of 
being self-employed is unaffected by access to microcredit. In the next three columns we model access to 
microcredit (dumMICROCREDIT) as an interaction-effect with women and lower castes. This 
interaction-term analyses whether lower self-employment levels among women and lower castes are 
influenced by access to microcredit. In other words, if women and Dalits would have access to 
microcredit, would they still have lower levels of self-employment than their male and upper caste 
counterparts? As can be seen, none of the coefficients on the interaction-terms are statistically significant 
suggesting that access to microcredit does not alleviate the lower self-employment figures of women and 
lower castes. The main conclusion of Table 3 is that access to microcredit plays virtually no role in 
promoting self-employment in our South Indian context.          
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<Insert table 3> 
 
Type of business: gender and caste matters 
This section focuses on the businesses that are initiated analysing whether gender and caste have an 
impact on criteria such as business type, age, size of initial investment, return and regularity of return, and 
business expansion. The differences found are again further explained using qualitative insights. Table 4 
shows the differences between men and women, and Dalits and mid and upper castes, across several 
business characteristics. Mann-Whitney, Pearson χ² and t-statistics test whether the observed differences 
are statistically significant.    
First, we look at the type of business initiated. Following a standard typology of small businesses, we 
divide our sample into three main types of business: ‘craftsmen’ account for slightly half of the whole 
sample (45.9%), ‘service providers’ and ‘vendors/traders’ represent slightly more than one quarter each 
(27.1% and 27.1% respectively). As the table shows, businesses started by women have a similar type-
breakdown to those started by men. Dalits, however, appear to operate in quite specific sectors. They are 
more frequently vendors (50% as opposed to 16.24% for non-Dalits) and less frequently craftsmen 
(28.57% as opposed to 56.41% for non-Dalits). They are slightly under-represented in services (21.43% as 
opposed to 27.35%), the observed differences being statistically significant.  
Next, we look at the age of businesses. Some lines of work have been passed down among generations, 
while others are more recent. There is no significant difference based on gender. For caste, by contrast, 
businesses started by Dalits are significantly younger than those started by higher castes. Dalit businesses 
had been running for 10.17 years on average, as opposed to 15.76 years for middle and upper castes.  
Finally, we look at the size and success rates of businesses measured in terms of initial investment size, 
annual income, regularity of income and growth in staff members9. Here we find that both Dalits and 
women are confined to smaller and less profitable activities. Both women and Dalits have significantly 
lower initial investment amounts. Across the whole sample, the average amount invested is 70,000 INR10. 
This ranges widely from 150 INR to 600,000 INR, with a median value of 15,000 INR. Around half of the 
respondents invested 10,000 INR or less, while 27.93% invested between 10,000 and 200,000 INR while 
the remainder (18.99%) invested over 200,000 INR. The average amount invested by women is almost 
                                      
9
 Collecting figures on small businesses is very challenging as many of them do not keep proper accounts. A number 
of precautions were taken here to ensure reliable figures: good knowledge of local prices and the operating costs of 
the most common businesses, an interview guide adapted for local contexts and local terminology, and the option of 
holding several interviews.   
10
 At the time of the survey, 1 INR = 0,0167 euros.  
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three times lower than for men (27,810 INR as opposed to 78,679 INR) and the differences between 
median is even greater (4,000 INR as opposed to 19,000 INR). The average amount invested by Dalits is 
approximately half the amount of non-Dalits (41,534 INR as opposed 84,690 INR).  
Labour force expansion is another indicator of business size and success. In our sample, 38.28% of 
businesses have one employee besides the owner. We do not find any caste differences, but gender seems 
to matter: women are less likely to have employees (16.67% as opposed to 42.75% for men). In terms of 
income, both women and Dalits earn significantly less than their male and upper/mid caste counterparts. 
Estimates of annual income indicate that women earn on average 34,555 INR, as opposed to 51,627 INR 
for men. Dalits earn on average 30,161 INR as opposed to 58,205 for non-Dalits, which is roughly half as 
much. 
 
<Insert table 4> 
 
We again turn to qualitative insights to enrich our understanding of the statistics observed. We will discuss 
caste and gender separately as they tend to have distinct influences on the type, size and success of 
businesses initiated.   
 
Caste-related business features  
First, traditional caste-based activities still continue. Just over a third of the entrepreneurs in our sample 
call their activity ‘caste-based’. For instance, in the category ‘craftsmen’, 59% of entrepreneurs do 
traditional handicraft (weaving, pottery, clay or wood toymaking, carpentry, shoemaking), each of which 
is associated with a particular caste. The remaining 41% of craftsmen are modern artisans such as masons, 
electricians and mechanics, where both Dalits and non-Dalits are found. Other particular services such as 
washing, ironing, drumming and horoscopes are only carried out by Dalits.  
Modern sector occupations are supposed to be caste-free (Fuller, 2003), but in practice many modern 
activities are often a continuation of previous caste-based activities (Harriss-White, 2003, pg. 177). From 
the various interviews we held with traders and buyers, across all castes, it appears that Dalits are virtually 
banned from sectors related to food and clothing. These are two types of goods with high symbolic 
connotations. Dalits only start out in these sectors with a very restricted clientele within their own caste. 
There are some rare exceptions, but most self-employed Dalits only have non-Dalit customers for 
traditionally caste-based, socially degrading and/or physically demanding jobs.  
The food retail-industry is a first example. This sector is monopolized by non-Dalits for several reasons. 
The food trade had traditionally been restricted to castes of merchants such as Chettiars and Nadars, who 
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even today control much of the sector for reasons of ideology (untouchability), reputation and network. 
They still have a quasi- monopoly on highly symbolic products such as oil. Vanniars, for instance, are one 
of the dominant castes in the region and often have small grocery stores, but very few sell oil. 
‘Untouchability’ bans Dalits from selling food to non-Dalits. We found a few exceptions in small towns, 
but in the villages this would virtually be unthinkable. Moreover, many Dalits prefer to buy food products 
with high symbolic value, such as oil, milk or rice, from non-Dalits. Reputation is probably critical here. 
Many products are sold by weight and are not pre-packaged, which means that shopkeepers are mostly 
valued for their honesty. Chettiars and Nadars have a solid reputation for reliability. Dalits often accuse 
their caste-fellows of cheating on weight, which, we were told several times, would be the only way for 
them to gain profit margin.  
Accessing networks and resources through caste is also central. The entire value chain, from wholesalers 
to retailers, is controlled by Chettiars, Nadars and to some extent Vanniars. This gives them privileged 
access to quality products at preferential rates, often on credit without additional cost. Repayments are 
flexible and are often based on sales rather than pre-fixed instalments. Shops are frequently part of family 
networks, and there are regular transfers of goods to avoid stock shortages. Where competition is strong, 
retailers can afford to have lower prices because profitability of the whole value chain is what counts. Sale 
on credit is a must-have in terms of competitiveness and client loyalty, but requires sound financial 
bedrock. In the villages, a few Dalit-run grocery shops can be found, but they are confined to Dalit 
settlements and only sell to Dalits. There is very little stock on display, and profitability is lower. Many 
have had to shut down because of too many default payments, too few clients, or purchases on credit 
straining their profitability. 
Tailoring is another interesting example. Tailors face strong competition from manufactured products. 
Even poor people in local populations want to buy modern clothing. Women want nylon saris bought in 
Chennai, and not locally produced cotton blouses. Young men no longer want dhotis, but blue jeans. At 
the same time, demand for tailor-made clothes for special occasions is increasing. Children are now more 
likely to attend school, from the early years to the end of secondary school and they frequently wear tailor-
made uniforms. Religious festivals and family celebrations are growing in scale and there is a big market 
for tailors through demand for wedding gifts and clothing for the event. Tailors are also often approached 
to recycle old clothes. Here too, the market is highly segmented. Non-Dalits refuse to touch clothes 
handled by the lowest castes. Moreover, experience is key to high quality work. Most tailors start out as 
apprentices or employees, something which Dalits, lacking networks and contacts, cannot do. Some 
NGOs offer training, but it is too brief for participants to gain real knowledge and know-how. Some try to 
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help women to access markets, but all the cases we encountered were a failure which is why there are 
virtually no Dalit tailors. 
Finally, ‘transportation services’ are a good illustration of the continuity between traditional and modern 
activities. At first glance, caste may not seem an issue. But looking at who transports what clearly shows 
strong segmentation. Non-Dalits transport passengers, while Dalits transport goods. The former requires 
personal links, the latter physical strength. Traditionally, Dalits have transported mostly agricultural goods 
using bullock carts. These have been replaced by small motor vehicles. Many financial companies sell 
them on credit to Dalits through leasing contracts, which prevent any risk, both for creditors and debtors. 
But Dalits still stick to transporting small quantities over short distances. Long-distance transport, which is 
more lucrative, is monopolized by the middle and upper castes. Dalits do also work in this area, but only 
as daily labourers for physically demanding loading and unloading tasks.  
Collective organizations and corporatism are another key difference between Dalits and non-Dalits. We 
found that association membership has a significant influence on the chances of starting a business. This is 
not surprising since trade is highly embedded in social relations and patronage still the most common way 
to access resources. But what counts more than having individual or household-level networks is their 
regulatory role on a more global level (Harriss-White 2003, pg. 184-193). Networks facilitate access to 
suppliers and clients. They can also defend collective interests and privileges, and organize markets. The 
transportation industry is a good example here too. The strong segmentation (with Dalits specializing in 
short distances and non-Dalits in long distances) is closely linked to non-Dalit corporatism. Non-Dalits 
use their strong alliances with public administration, where they are also over-represented, to manage 
licensing and procurement. They spend a lot of time in places such as tea stalls or their own shops, where 
flows of information circulate.  They cooperate to fix prices: the market structure here is much closer to 
collusion than competition. They lend to each other (bank loans represent only a meagre share of debt). 
They help each other out, for example when one of them is unable to supply an order on time. Dalits by 
contrast are usually poorly organized. Most buy their vehicle on credit from a financial company and face 
strong pressure for repayment. The market for short-distance transport is overcrowded highly competitive 
and therefore not lucrative. Small transporters may help each other out from time to time, but do not 
engage in any collective action and have very little control over pricing. They do not need licences, but are 
often harassed by public officials to pay taxes, while the vast majority of big transporters operate outside 
any legal or fiscal restrictions.  
 
Gender 
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As discussed above pure female entrepreneurship remains marginal. Given that the social norms relegate 
women to a state of dependency, female entrepreneurship goes against the social norm. As we discussed 
earlier, patriarchal norms greatly restrict female labour by controlling women's mobility. Women who are 
too mobile suffer damage to their reputation and honour, especially among higher castes. Domestic 
obligations, which women still mostly bear, are also important. In other parts of India, mobility 
restrictions on women have promoted home-based forms of self-employment such as sewing and stitching 
for the garment industry, rolling beedi or incense sticks. There are no such industries in our two districts, 
however. Agriculture is thus the most common source of employment for women and daily agricultural 
wage labour has become mostly women's work in recent decades. Dalit women face less restrictive norms 
on their mobility, but have just as many domestic obligations. They also face additional obstacles due to 
being Dalit. 
Women's low autonomy to run businesses is why the few who do take business initiatives go into similar 
sectors to men. There are more gendered divisions in certain categories, such as trade and trade services. 
In retail, for example, women typically sell low-value products, mostly or exclusively for women, from 
home or door-to-door in the villages. These include food, sarees, imitation jewellery and cosmetics. 
Sometimes, male family members (husbands, sons, brothers and fathers) are involved in the supply 
process. This allows women to stay at home, in respect of social norms. Some women take care of the 
supply themselves but this requires some freedom of movement. This is more common with older women 
or middle and upper caste widows. Dalit women face fewer restrictions but this remains a very relative 
freedom. Women do not escape the rules of commensality, either, and it is rare for Dalit women to sell to 
non-Dalit women. 
As such, it is hardly surprising that women run smaller businesses than men (as we have seen above, their 
initial investment is three times lower) and that they bring in a limited income. This is partly a matter of 
access to capital and assets (Garikipati, 2008). The law stipulates for daughters to inherit equally, but this 
is not the case in practice. Girls receive a dowry at their wedding which is supposed to compensate them 
for their lack of an inheritance. This usually includes gold and furniture, or sometimes small pieces of 
land, and increasingly, motorcycles. But all this is often seen as collective property (and even exclusively 
male property for motorbikes). Women are in a poor position to build up savings from their wage 
incomes, which are very low.  
Irrespective of ‘access to capital’, the very low level of opportunities open to women is the major reason 
why their businesses remain small. The women all have the same questions: what should be sold, where 
and to whom? In our study area, the three microcredit organizations provide additional services for 
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entrepreneurship such as training and assistance to access markets (for instance for tailoring). But these 
efforts have failed to remove the multiple social barriers women face. 
As a result, microcredit in our study region has largely failed to promote income-generating activities for 
women. In our sample, 38% of households received at least one microcredit in the year prior to the survey 
and women have been the most common beneficiaries by far. Less than 10% of these loans, however, has 
been used for economic investment. Only 7.9% is used for agriculture, and 2% for non-farm investment. 
Microloans are mostly used for daily expenses, health, past debt repayment, education, housing and 
ceremonies. When questioned, neither male nor female entrepreneurs mentioned microcredit as a source 
of finance.   
Inadequate microloan conditions are probably one cause for such failure. Microcredit is often too small  
(around 10,000 INR on average) and inflexible to finance a sustainable income-generating activity. 
Monthly instalments are badly suited to the irregularity and seasonality of many small businesses. 
According to our survey, businesses started by men and women are partly funded by savings and 
inheritances, and partly through debt. But more flexible sources also come into play. These include 
relatives, local private moneylenders, traders and suppliers. In very rare cases, banks or financial 
companies are a further source. One of the major advantages middle and upper caste businessmen enjoy is 
ready access to cheap and flexible cash from their peers, as we have seen above for the transport sector. In 
this market, financial practices are also embedded within local social institutions that are much more 
efficient than microcredit, but largely beyond the reach of marginalised categories (Guérin et al. 2013b). 
 
Conclusions and discussion 
The microcredit movement relies heavily on the idea that every poor person has the potential to become a 
successful entrepreneur. By helping the poor access credit, the untapped entrepreneurial spirit of the poor 
is expected to emerge, and economic development to follow. From this rather narrow perspective, the 
ability to start a business is mainly a matter of skills, financial resources, managerial capacity and access 
to basic infrastructure. 
Some scholars, however, express concerns about this ‘entrepreneurial capability’ of the poor. They 
highlight either microeconomic factors (such as Banerjee and Duflo, 2011) or macroeconomic factors 
(such as Bateman, 2011; Servet 2006, 2010) to argue that the poor have a very low chance of engaging in 
a successful income-generating activity. Their arguments have been supported by empirical studies 
showing that microfinance is often used for consumption and that there are many difficulties involved in 
the poor becoming successful entrepreneurs (Morduch, 2013; Perry, 2002; Rahman, 1999; Elyachar, 
2006).  
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This paper on rural South India combines quantitative analysis and qualitative insights to explore a further 
impediment that marginalized categories face in developing an income-generating activity, namely the 
social barriers of gender and caste. In the Tamil Nadu region, women and Dalits have a significantly lower 
chance of being self-employed when controlling for individual and household characteristics. 
Furthermore, we find no significant statistical relation between access to microcredit and the chance of 
being self-employed. Qualitative analyses suggest that social regulation and norms on caste and gender 
shape local markets and determine who can produce or sell what, to whom at what price.  
We also find that women and Dalits when they are able to produce or sell on their own, tend to be 
restricted to certain activities and therefore stick to smaller and less profitable businesses. While they are 
officially self-employed, they are socially restricted to particular low-income sectors with little or no 
growth prospects. Social norms restrict their networks which hinder their access to suppliers, clients, 
finance, administrative support, and other necessary resources.   
Our analysis reinforces the idea that funding is just one of many factors for successful entrepreneurship. 
Both Dalits and women have a significantly lower initial investment. They are likely to have lower 
amounts to invest and greater difficulties in accessing credit. They suffer from discrimination from both 
formal and informal lenders (Guérin et al., 2013b). While ‘untouchability’ is less of a concern than it 
historically was in India, patriarchy remains a particularly pressing issue. We ultimately find the market to 
be very highly segmented and unequal. 
Access to capital will not alleviate the many social barriers women and Dalits face. This does not mean 
microcredit is of no use, because it may help to bridge shortfalls in income, as various studies have 
suggested (Patole and Sinha, 2005)11. Additionally, as Kalpana’s work on a different region of Tamil 
Nadu has highlighted, women may use microcredit groups as a ‘space of socialisation’ to avoid rather than 
fight patriarchal norms (Kalpana, 2011). But the fact remains that microcredit is ineffective as far as job 
creation is concerned. 
We believe this paper makes a number of important contributions of interest to research and policy. From 
a theoretical perspective, it shows the extent to which markets are socially structured and regulated. The 
most vulnerable groups, such as women and Dalits, are the least likely to successfully start up a business 
because of the persistent social regulations that shape local markets. The norms underlying social 
regulations are not fixed over time and are constantly changing but still considerably restrict opportunities 
for marginalized categories. While our findings apply to a very specific context, they echo a long-standing 
school of research that approaches markets as institutions within larger social and political systems. They 
                                      
11
 Even this, however, remains controversial (Garikipati et al., 2014) especially when supply exceeds local 
absorption capacities leading to over-indebtedness, as has been seen in Andhra Pradesh (Taylor, 2011). 
Page 17 of 27 Development and Change
17 
 
draw on the work of authors like Weber (on how markets are shaped through struggles and power 
constellations) (Weber, 1978, pg. 108), Polanyi (on how markets are embedded in social interactions and 
connected to other principles of exchange) (Polanyi, 1977, chapter 1), and Bourdieu (on how the ‘field’ in 
which markets are situated dominates their dynamics) (Bourdieu, 2000). This strand of literature 
approaches markets as consisting of social relationships between individuals who have highly unequal 
material, cultural, social and symbolic resources. Only in-depth empirical studies can show the specific 
manifestation of market structures within a specific context (Morvant et al., 2014). But as much recent 
research evidence has shown, we can reasonably assume that all markets are to a certain degree socially 
structured12. While development policies are increasingly market-based, there is an urgent need to move 
away from an abstract vision of markets as contracts between equals and to see them as what they really 
are: socially constructed entities reflecting power relations between individuals with unequal resources.  
As far as microcredit policy is concerned, we believe microcredit cannot succeed unless the social 
regulation of markets is acknowledged. The social, cultural and political barriers women and lower castes 
face must be substantially alleviated. Given this has not yet happened and the distinctive kinds of 
businesses that women and lower castes are setting up, it seems likely that microcredit in its current form 
is strengthening rather than weakening social inequalities. Moreover, microcredit does not currently 
enhance job-creation and will not do so unless social barriers are alleviated. One central point here 
concerns the fight against discrimination. In our case study, Dalits and women face high levels of 
discrimination which exclude them from many activities or condemn them to be stuck at the end of the 
value chain. This is of course a long-term struggle and calls for action on multiple levels (Mosse, 2010) 
that are beyond the scope of this paper, but cannot be ignored. Promoting self-employment for the 
discriminated segments of societies is simply destined to fail if one ignores the underlying social causes of 
such discrimination. With particular regards to gender, and far beyond the Indian case, empirical evidence 
has indicated that the microfinance industry's focus on women by no means shows that it takes gender 
discrimination seriously (Agier and Szafarz, 2013; D’Espallier et al., 2011; Johnson, 2013).  
On a more abstract note, one could even challenge policies that promote self-employment altogether. 
Some people can certainly benefit from microcredit but the number of people among the poor who are 
willing and able to run a sustainable business is undoubtedly much more limited than expected. Not only 
do self-employment policies such as microcredit have a limited impact, but they may also reinforce 
considerable unfairness within capitalist accumulation. They promote the individualization of risk and 
‘entrepreneurs of the self’ which is at the core of current neoliberal policies (Rose, 1999). Microcredit has 
taken highly diverse approaches, paths and ideologies, so the question of whether it is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ is 
                                      
12
 For a review, see Swedberg (2003). Even Wall Street markets are socially regulated, see for instance Ho (2009).  
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not necessarily helpful (Armendáriz and Labie, 2011). Nevertheless, the microcredit industry's growing 
commercialization, ‘financialisation’, and increasingly close links to global capital have raised serious 
questions over its ethics (Hudon and Sandberg, 2013) and its effective capacity to promote redistribution, 
justice and poverty alleviation (Augsburg and Fouillet, 2010; Bateman, 2010; Fernando, 2006; Guérin et 
al., 2013a; Roy, 2010). Several ethnographies have shown how some microcredit programmes with a 
primary focus on loan disbursement and repayment can discipline or even dispossess the poor (Elyachar, 
2006). Women are particularly affected (Karim, 2011; Rankin, 2002).  
Despite recent over-indebtedness crises (Guérin et al., 2013a), the ‘financialisation’ of microcredit 
continues to spread. The very purpose of microfinance should be to spread risk and this is a key condition 
for finance to create wealth and promote redistribution. But current ‘financialisation processes’ merely 
serve to protect lenders and shift the risk disproportionately onto the poor. As Aitken (2013) argues, the 
microcredit industry has adopted evaluation, securitization and intermediation tools to ensure lender 
security, while transferring the risks of global capital onto the borrowers. More importantly, one can 
question the legitimacy of development policies driven by a ‘regime of indebtedness’ (Dienst, 2011). They 
drain already low and irregular labour income, and subordinate ordinary people to the rules of capital 
(Graeber, 2011; Lazzaroto, 2011). When local populations are already highly indebted, as it is the case 
here (Guérin et al., 2013b; Morvant et al., 2015), is microcredit part of the solution, or the problem?  
It is crucial to rethink microcredit in terms of the much broader goal of reforming finance, markets, local 
economies and their links to the global system. This calls for action on various levels. On the local level, 
its means helping small entrepreneurs who face discrimination based on their caste, gender, ethnicity, 
religion. They need the means to organize themselves to influence the design of quality standards, the 
fixation of prices, the winning of contracts from the public sector, and so on. This will allow them to 
access markets and achieve a stronger position within the value chain. It also means helping women to 
access property, reduce their domestic burdens and the constraints on their physical mobility. On a wider 
level, it means rethinking microcredit less as a way to give the poor access to finance in a context driven 
by debt and over-indebtedness, and more as a way to enhance collective empowerment of marginalized 
groups and the revitalization of marginalized local economies. Rather than inserting individuals into 
global value chains, this means creating local networks by linking up producers, service providers and 
local consumers (Bateman, 2010, pg. 167-200; França Filho et al., 2013). This needs real determination to 
fight discrimination and to change the rules of the game. It will also ultimately need full recognition of the 
rights of marginalized communities, so they can speak for themselves and get collectively organised, in 
order to influence how markets are shaped and structured.  
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Table 1. Overall self-employment figures 
Self-employment statistics on the household-level (panel A) and on the individual level (panel B). Pearson χ²-stats 
and t-tests assess whether the observed differences are statistically different between women and men / Dalits and 
higher castes.   
 
Panel A. Families All dalits mid & upper caste 
# total 405 192 212 
# self-employed 150 54 95 
% self-employed 37% 28% 45% 
# not self-employed 255 138 117 
% not self-employed 63% 72% 55% 
pearson χ² (dalits vs. mid/up) 12.05***   
t-test (dalits vs. mid/up) 3.515***     
 
Panel B. Individuals all Gender Caste 
    men Women dalits mid & upper caste 
# total 1,929 1,007 921 933 995 
# self-employed 176 145 30 58 117 
% self-employed 9% 14% 3% 6% 12% 
# not self-employed 1,753 862 891 875 878 
% not self-employed 91% 86% 97% 94% 82% 
pearson χ² (men vs. women) 72.35***     
pearson χ² (dalits vs. mid/up) 17.92***     
ttest (men vs. women) 8.66***     
ttest (dalits vs. mid/up) 4.25***         
Source: RUME (Rural Employment and Microfinance) survey 2010 
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Table 2. Do women and dalits have a lower chance of being self-employed? A multivariate analysis  
LOGIT-analyses where the dummy self-employed is regressed against gender and caste, controlling for 
individual characteristics (age, education), household-characteristics (size of HH, social capital in terms of a 
dummy whether the family is involved in any political, cultural or any other association) as well as geographical 
controls (accessibility of the village, village dummies). Significance levels based upon robust standard errors. 
*,** and *** report significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.  
 
dep var. self-employment =1  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
variables of interest       
dumFEMALE -1.58*** -1.64***   -1.60*** -1.66*** 
dumDALIT   -0.62*** -0.39** -0.67*** -0.45** 
       
individual controls       
Age 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
dumEDUCATIONHIGH 0.17 0.09 0.43** 0.41** 0.11 0.06 
       
household controls       
size of HH -0.17** -0.16** -0.16** -0.16** -0.15** -0.16** 
dumASSOCIATION 0.49*** 0.34* 0.47*** 0.35* 0.49** 0.35* 
dumLANDOWNER -0.37** -0.26 -0.52*** -0.35* -0.49*** -0.33* 
       
geographical controls       
dumBADACCESS - 0.93** - 0.75** - 0.93** 
village dummies no yes No Yes no yes 
       
model statistics             
# observations 1,807 1,802 1,807 1,802 1,807 1,802 
Wald χ² 157.70*** 171.59*** 139.22*** 159.12*** 160.63*** 175.70*** 
pseudo R² 0.14 0.19 0.10 0.14 0.16 0.20 
Source: survey RUME 2010 
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Table 3. Microfinance and the chance of being self-employed. 
LOGIT-analyses extended with access to microfinance. DumMICROCREDIT is a dummy that is 1 if the household 
is involved in a microcredit loan. In the first three columns, dumMICROCREDIT is added as an extra explanatory 
variable investigating whether the chance of being self-employed is statistically influenced by having access to 
microcredit. In the last three columns, dumMICROCREDIT  is modeled as an interaction-term with dumFEMALE 
and dumDALIT investigating whether the lower self-employment by women and Dalits is influenced by access to 
microcredit. Significance levels based upon robust standard errors. *,** and *** report significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level.  
 
dep var. self-employment =1  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
dumMICROCREDIT 0.12 0.10 0.11    
       
gender and caste       
DumFEMALE -1.64***  -1.65*** -1.89***  -1.95*** 
DumDALIT  -0.39** -0.42**  -0.38* -0.37* 
       
interactions dumMICROCREDIT       
(dumFEMALE * dumMICROCREDIT)    0.49  0.59 
(dumDALIT * dumMICROCREDIT)     -0.27 -0.43 
       
individual controls       
Age 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 
DumEDUCATIONHIGH 0.10 0.42** 0.07 0.08 0.40** 0.05 
       
household controls       
size of HH -0.17** -0.16** -0.16** -0.17** -0.16** -0.16** 
DumASSOCIATION 0.33* 0.35* 0.34* 0.33* 0.36* 0.34* 
DumLANDOWNER -0.25 -0.34* -0.32* -0.25 -0.35* -0.32* 
       
geographical controls       
DumBADACCESS 0.89** 0.71* 0.88** 0.89** 0.78** 0.91** 
village dummies yes yes yes Yes Yes yes 
       
model statistics             
# observations 1802 1802 1802 1802 1802 1802 
Wald χ² 171.95*** 158.32*** 157.72*** 170.43*** 162.67*** 175.84 
pseudo R² 0.19 0.14 0.20 0.20 0.14 0.20 
Source: survey RUME 2010 
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Table 4. Diversity of self-employment along gender and caste 
Type of self-employment, size of the investment, age, return, regularity and expansion of the businesses analyzed for all businesses, male versus female initiated businesses 
and dalit versus mid/upper caste initiated businesses. Mann-Whitney is the non-parametric test analyzing whether proportions nominal variables differ along gender and caste, 
t-tests assert the null that the mean-values are different along caste and gender.       
 
diversity of businesses   All businesses female initiated male initiated dalit initiated mid/upcaste initiated 
    n = 173 n = 30 n = 143 n = 58 n = 115 
type of business Craftsman 47.40% 50.00% 46.85% 28.57% 56.41% 
 Service 25.43% 20.00% 26.57% 21.43% 27.35% 
 vendor/trader 27.17% 30.00% 26.57% 50.00% 16.24% 
 Mann-Whitney stat. (male vs. female) 0.05     
 Mann-Whitney stat. (dalit vs. mid/up) 4.36***     
       
size of initial investment Mean 70,052 27,810 78,679 41,534 84,690 
 Median 15,000 4,000 19,000 15,000 15,000 
 Min 150 500 150 150 500 
 Max 600,000 325,000 600,000 500,000 600,000 
 ttest (male vs. female) 1.93*     
 ttest (dalit vs. mid/up) 2.06**     
       
age of the business Mean 13.9 14.13 13.86 10.17 15.76 
 Median 8 8 8 6.5 9 
 Min 1 2 1 1 1 
 Max 50 40 50 40 50 
 ttest (male vs. female) 0.10     
 ttest (dalit vs. mid/up) 2.72***     
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return on the business Mean 48,748 34,555 51,627 30,161 58,205 
(constructed annual income) Median 29,125 18,000 30,000 24,000 35,500 
 Min 3,750 3,750 3,750 4,500 3,750 
 Max 600,000 200,000 600,000 120,000 600,000 
 ttest (male vs. female) 2.25*     
 ttest (dalit vs. mid/up) 2.64***     
       
regularity on the business Mean 4.15 4.93 4.00 3.91 4.28 
(# months average income) Median 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
 Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Max 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 
 Pearson χ² (male vs. female) 0.12     
 Pearson χ² (dalit vs. mid/up) 1.94     
       
expansion of the business Mean 38.28% 16.67% 42.75% 36.20% 39.31% 
(1 if other employees employed) ttest (male vs. female) 2.71***     
 ttest (dalit vs. mid/up) 0.39     
Source: survey RUME 2010 
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